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Abstract
We show that an increase of memory of past strategy performance in a simple agent-based
innovation model, with agents switching between costly innovation and cheap imitation, can
be quantitatively stabilising while at the same time qualitatively destabilising. As memory
in the fitness measure increases, the amplitude of price fluctuations decreases, but at the
same time a bifurcation route to chaos may arise.
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1. Introduction
Economic and, more generally, social systems of many interacting decision makers have
been fruitfully studied with tools from statistical physics [1, 2, 3]. With this approach, their
emergent properties can often be addressed as if dealing with a dynamical system of much
lower dimensionality [4].
In agent based economic modelling the introduction of memory in the agents’ decision
mechanisms is usually thought of as having a stabilising effect on the economic system, in
the sense that it reduces price variability over time [5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. Intuitively, memory has a
smoothing effect on variables entering the price equation, leading to reduced amplitudes of
price fluctuations.
In this paper we show that such a quantitative stabilisation may in fact be accompanied
by a qualitative destabilisation, since, although memory may reduce the variance of prices,
the dynamics can become more irregular or even chaotic. We demonstrate this using the
cobweb demand-supply model with discrete choice dynamics introduced by [10], reducing it
to the simplest case of two types of agents with rational expectations, differing only in their
cost structure.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a simple benchmark economic
dynamic model. Section 3 introduces memory in the model and studies its effects. Section
4 concludes.
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2. The model
Consider an industry with a large number of firms producing the same good in a perfectly
competitive market, as in [10]. However, instead of considering agents who can choose
from a number of different price predictors, consider the case where all agents have rational
expectations but differ in the cost structure of the technology they use to produce the good.
In particular, there are two available strategies: innovation, which requires an investment
but also leads to a reduction in production cost, and imitation, which amounts to keeping
the currently available technology. The relative fraction of innovators in period t, t ∈ N,
is denoted by nt ∈ [0, 1], while the fraction of imitators is 1 − nt. The quantity Sh(pt),
h ∈ {inn, im}, where ‘inn’ represents innovation and ‘im’ imitation, supplied in period t by
a firm choosing strategy h is a function of price and depends itself on the cost structure of
strategy h. The total supply is a fraction-weighted convex combination of the supply by the
innovators and the imitators. In each period t the market clears according to a Walrasian
temporary market equilibrium in which demand equals supply, that is,
D(pt) = ntS
inn
t (pt) + (1− nt)Simt (pt). (1)
The profits piht of a firm of type h in period t are pi
h
t = ptq
h
t − ch(qht ), with qht ≡ Sht (pt). As
in [11], a quadratic cost function is assumed; the cost of producing quantity q for a firm
adopting strategy h is ch(q) = q
2
2sh
+Ch, where Ch represents the fixed costs of the strategy.
This keeps the model as simple as possible, since maximisation of profits with respect to
quantity q gives rise to a linear supply function
Sinnt (pt) = s
innpt, S
im
t (pt) = s
impt. (2)
The parameters sinn and sim are inversely proportional to the marginal production cost,
and can be thought of as the productivity of innovators and imitators, respectively. An
innovator invests Cinn = C > 0 and increases productivity by a factor ebC , where b > 0
represents the benefits of the innovation investment: sinn = sebC . An imitator is left with
sim = s.
Following [10], we assume evolutionary selection or reinforcement learning of strategies.
More precisely, we assume that firms switch between two strategies, innovation versus imita-
tion, based on a measure Ut of past performance, and use the discrete choice model according
to which the fractions are determined by the logistic equation
nt =
eβU
inn
t−1
eβU
inn
t−1 + eβU
im
t−1
=
1
1 + e−β∆Ut−1
, (3)
where ∆Ut ≡ U innt − U imt . The larger (smaller) the difference in past performance ∆Ut−1
between the two strategies, the more (less) firms will decide to innovate. The intensity of
choice β measures how sensitive firms are to performance differences. For β = 0 agents split
equally among the different types. On the other hand, β =∞ represents the limit where all
agents choose the strategy with the best past performance.
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Without memory, the performance measure Uht coincides with the profit pi
t
h for type h
realised in the last period, i.e. Uht = pi
h
t . For the quadratic cost function these profits are
piinnt =
1
2
sinnp2t − C, and piimt =
1
2
simp2t . (4)
The difference in performance between the two strategies is then ∆Ut = pi
inn
t −piimt ≡ ∆pit =
1
2
s(ebC − 1)p2t − C. In particular ∆pi = 0 for p = p ≡
√
2C
s(ebC−1) .
For analytical tractability, we consider a linear demand function D(pt) = a−dpt (d > 0).
The market equilibrium equation (1) becomes
a− dpt = ntsinnpt + (1− nt)simpt. (5)
Solving for pt we obtain
pt =
a
d+ sebCnt + s(1− nt) ≡ f(nt). (6)
The function f is decreasing in the fraction nt, since e
bC > 1, which means that a larger
number of innovators is associated to a lower market price. When everybody innovates the
price reaches its minimum value p∗inn = a/(d + se
bC). On the other hand, the maximum
market price is p∗im = a/(d + s), when there are only imitators, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
The more innovators, the steeper the aggregate supply curve and the lower the price. This
Figure 1: Demand and supply curves with D(p) = 4 − p, sinn = 3 and sim = 1. This gives S(p) =
ninn3p+ nimp. With only innovators the price is p∗inn = 1, while with only imitators it is p
∗
im = 2.
mechanism results in a minority game dynamics [12, 13] as we infer from agents’ profits (4):
a lower price hurts innovators more than imitators, so that innovating is more attractive
when less agents are innovators. Equivalently, imitating is better in a market dominated by
innovators. Using (3) and (4) we have
nt =
(
1 + e−β[
1
2
s(ebC−1)p2t−1−C]
)−1
. (7)
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If we substitute (6) into (7), we obtain a one-dimensional system:
nt =
(
1 + e
−β
{
s(ebC−1)a2
2[d+sebCnt−1+s(1−nt−1)]
2−C
})−1
≡ g(nt−1).
(8)
An equilibrium is a fixed point n∗ of the function g. Since g is decreasing, there exists
only one equilibrium, which can be either locally stable or locally unstable. In the latter
case we have periodic dynamics with period 2. The equilibrium is locally stable whenever
−1 < g′(n∗) < 0, and typically it becomes locally unstable for large values of β [14].
The intuition behind the period 2 dynamics is that innovation drives down the price,
and at some point the profits from innovation become too low due to the fixed costs C, so
that imitation becomes preferable. A net flow towards imitative behaviour starts, and the
price goes up. The increasing price boosts the innovators’ profits more than the imitators’,
because of their larger productivity. When the innovator’s profits become larger than the
imitator’s, most agents switch back to innovation, and the story is repeated. This cyclical
behaviour reflects a “minority game” dynamics: the strategy adopted by the minority turns
out to be more profitable. Hence, there is a negative feedback due to the endogenous strategy
adaptation mechanism.
3. Memory
Next we extend the model of the previous subsection by assuming that agents also also
take into account profits pis, s ≤ t, from the further past. The performance measure is [10]
Uht = wU
h
t−1 + (1− w)piht . (9)
with w ∈ [0, 1). The parameter w determines the degree of memory. For larger values of w
the past profits are weighted relatively high compared to the last observed profit pit−1. For
w = 0 we are back at the basic model, and only profits from the previous period are taken
into account.
We will show that the introduction of memory has a quantitatively stabilising effect and
a qualitatively destabilising effect in this model. Note that the system with memory is still
one-dimensional. The difference in performance between innovators and imitators evolves
according to
∆Ut = w∆Ut−1 + (1− w)∆pit. (10)
Using Eqs. (3) and (6) one can express the difference of realised profits ∆pit =
1
2
s(ebC −
1)p2t − C as a function of ∆Ut−1:
∆pit =
s(ebC − 1)a2
2
[
d+ s
(
1 + e
bC−1
1+e−β∆Ut−1
)]2 − C
≡ h(∆Ut−1),
(11)
where h(∆Ut−1) is decreasing in ∆Ut−1. If we substitute Eq. (11) into Eq. (10) we obtain a
one-dimensional map
∆Ut = w∆Ut−1 + (1− w)h(∆Ut−1)
≡ Hw(∆Ut−1), (12)
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describing the system in terms of the state variable ∆Ut. Notice that Hw is the convex
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Figure 2: Graph of the map of differential performance ∆Ut = Hw(∆Ut−1) for different values of the memory
weight w (β = 10, C = 1, b = 1, s = 2, a = 4 d = 1).
combination of an increasing and a decreasing function, which results in a non-monotonic
map for intermediate values of w. This is illustrated in Fig. 2, which shows a number of maps
for different values of w. [15] showed similar non-monotonic maps for the cobweb model with
homogeneous adaptive learning. Fig. 3 shows bifurcation diagrams for memory weights w
between 0 and 1 for three different values of the intensity of choice β. In all cases it can
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Figure 3: Bifurcation diagrams of the memory weight w for ∆U . Top: β = 7. Centre: β = 11. Bottom:
β = 15. Other parameters are C = 1, b = 1, s = 2, a = 4 and d = 1.
be observed that as the degree of memory w increases the amplitude of the stable two-cycle
decreases. For values of w close to 1, with much weight given to prices in the distant past,
stable dynamics arise. When the intensity of choice to switch strategies is high (bottom
panel), the decreasing amplitude of the flucutations is accompanied by a period-doubling
route to chaos, leading to chaotic fluctuations for intermediate values of w.
The core mechanism leading to the chaotic behaviour in this cobweb discrete choice
model is that the map obtained for the system with memory is a convex combination of an
increasing linear function and a decreasing non-linear function.
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4. Conclusions
Using a simple discrete choice model we have shown that memory can have a qualitatively
destabilising effect, beside the commonly acknowledged quantitative stabilisation. The value
of the intensity of choice is critical in this respect, with higher strategy switching intensity
leading to irregular behaviour and a bifurcation route to chaos.
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